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BROOKFIELD MULTIPLEX LTD V OWNERS 
CORPORATION STRATA PLAN 61288: MORE 
CERTAINTY CONCERNING THE BUILDER’S DUTY 
OF CARE FOR ECONOMIC LOSS  
  
BRITTANY CHERRY* 
I     INTRODUCTION 
 
In an ever expanding world of commercial development and enterprise, concurrent 
claims for breach of contract and damage in tort for pure economic loss reflect a 
modern reality.  The burden of this developing norm on those in commerce is evident.  
The 2014 case of Brookfield Multiplex Ltd v Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 
(‘Brookfield’)1 brings more certainty to the scope and ambit of the builder’s duty of 
care for economic loss.  The High Court held unanimously in this case that the builder 
of a serviced apartment hotel did not owe the strata corporation a duty of care in tort 
in respect of economic loss caused by latent defects in the common property.2  In 
delivering its decision the High Court overturned the NSW Court of Appeal decision,3 
and reached the same conclusion as the primary judge.4 
Recovery in tort for pure economic loss has only been possible since 1964.5  Since 
then the law surrounding the precise requirements for recovery have been somewhat 
obscured by subsequent cases, including Bryan v Maloney (‘Bryan’)6 and Woolcock 
Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (‘Woolcock’).7  Eleven years have passed 
since Woolcock8 and the position is now made clearer with the High Court’s decision 
in Brookfield.  To find a duty of care in tort for pure economic loss, a combination of 
salient features of the relationship between the parties must exist, including, 
vulnerability, an assumption of responsibility and known reliance.9  The High Court 
also made it abundantly clear that in regards to negligence causing pure economic loss 
the ‘common law has not developed with a view to alter[ing] the allocation of 
                                                          
* Fifth and final year LLB/BA student, University of Notre Dame Australia 
1 (2014) 313 ALR 408; [2014] HCA 36. 
2 Ibid 420 [36] (French CJ).  Four separate judgements were delivered under the High Court’s 
unanimous decision.  See also the following relating to this case, Domenic Cucinotta, ‘Brookfield 
Multiplex v Owners Corporation Strata Plan No 61288 (2014) 88 ALJR 911: Contractual Allocation of 
Risk and Claims for Pure Economic Loss’ (2014) 3 Journal of Civil Litigation and Practice 140; 
Christopher Blue and Sarah Merrett, ‘Defective Buildings and Pure Economic Loss: Builder Does Not 
Owe a Duty of Care to Subsequent Owners’ (2014) 29 Australian Property Law Bulletin 174; Peter 
Ross and Eli Ball, ‘Strata Claims in the High Court: No Duty to Protect Owners Corporations from 
Pure Economic Loss’ (2014) 11 (10) Australian Civil Liability (newsletter) 126. 
3 The Owners - Strata Plan No 61288 v Brookfield Australia Investments Ltd [2013] NSWCA 317; 
(2013) 85 NSWLR 479 (‘Court of Appeal Decision’). 
4 Owners Corporation Strata Plan 61288 v Brookfield Multiplex [2012] NSWSC 1219 (‘First Instance 
Decision’). 
5 See Caltex Oil (Aust) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ (1976) 136 CLR 529; Hedley Byrne & Co 
Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465.  See also, Cucinotta, above n 2, 145. 
6 (1995) 182 CLR 609. 
7 (2004) 216 CLR 515. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See also, Blue and Merrett, above n 2, 175. 
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economic risks between parties to a contract by supplementing or supplanting the 
terms of the contract by duties imposed by the law of tort’.10   
II     BACKGROUND TO THE CASE 
 
In August 1997 Chelsea Apartments Pty Ltd (‘the developer’), the registered 
proprietor and property developer, entered into a Master Agreement with an investor, 
Stockland Trust Group (‘Stockland’).  Under the Master Agreement, the developer 
leased the apartments to Park Hotel Management Pty Ltd (‘Park Hotel’), a subsidiary 
of Stockland, which operated the apartments collectively as a ‘serviced apartment 
hotel’ under the Holiday Inn brand.11  
 
A     The Master Agreement 
The Master Agreement dictated that the apartments were to be sold subject to the 
leases granted to Park Hotel.  Under the terms of the leases, Park Hotel acquired the 
developer’s rights to direct the operation of the Owners Corporation; requiring the 
purchasers to yield their voting rights in the Owners Corporation to the operator, by 
appointing it as their proxy.12  The Master Agreement clearly outlined that the 
developers warranted the quality of its building work to Stockland.13  
 
B     The Design and Construct Contract (‘D&C Contract’) 
In November of the same year, the developer entered into a design and construct 
contract (‘D&C contract’) with Brookfield Multiplex Ltd (‘the builder’) for about 
$57.5 million.14  The D&C contract outlined the standard of services that would be 
provided by the builder;15 the builder would provide warranties for the work and 
remedy any defects or omissions in the work.16  The D&C contract also provided for 
a 52 week defects liability period, which commenced upon the completion of the 
works.17  During this period, the builder would be liable to rectify construction defects.  
At the expiry of the period, a Final Certificate was to be issued by the Superintendent 
verifying that the finished product aligned with the D&C contract;18 its issuance would 
release the builder from all liability for defects that could have been identified before 
the receipt of the Final Certificate.  After issuance, the developer was required, at its 
own expense, to repair any defects in the common property as identified in the 
purchasers’ defect notices.19  An exception was made in clause 42.6(b) of the D&C 
contract, providing contractual protection for the developer in respect of any expense 
incurred from repairing latent defects in the building after the defect liability period 
                                                          
10 Brookfield (2014) 313 ALR 408, 438 [132] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ) citing Downsview Nominees 
Ltd v First City Corporation Ltd [1993] AC 295, 316. 
11 Brookfield (2014) 313 ALR 408, 413 [13] (French CJ). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid 428 [73] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
14 Ibid 414 [14] (French CJ). 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid 414 [15] (French CJ); 421, [42] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
17 Ibid 414 [15] (French CJ); 429 [80] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
18 Ibid 429 [82] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
19 Ibid 414 [16] (French CJ). 
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had expired.20  Finally, it was ‘common ground’ that this contract ‘was negotiated 
between sophisticated and experienced parties at arms’ length and on an equal 
footing.’21 
C     Standard Sales Contract  
Annexed to the D&C contract was a standard form contract of sale (‘the sale contract’) 
for purchasers of the apartments.  Clause 26.1 of the sale contract outlined that the 
purchaser warranted that it did not rely on any representations or warranties about the 
subject matter of the sale contract, except those set out in the sale contract.22  Further, 
clause 26.1 confirmed that the purchaser had ‘obtained appropriate independent advice 
on its obligations under the contract.’23  Clause 32.1 of the sale contract set out the 
purchaser’s rights in respect of the quality of construction; it obliged the developer, 
before completion, to ‘cause the property and the Common Property to be finished as 
specified in the Schedule of Finishes’ and ‘in a proper and workmanlike manner’.24  
Under clause 32.7, the developer was obliged to repair defects or faults in the common 
property due to faulty material or workmanship.25 
D     The Strata Scheme Legislation: Owners Corporation 
Before the Final Certificate was issued, the strata plan was registered for the serviced 
apartments.26  Upon the registration, the Owners Corporation was brought into 
existence and operated under s 8(1) of the Strata Schemes Management Act 1996 
(NSW) (‘SSM Act’) and common property was vested in it.27  The Owners Corporation 
was bound under a statutory duty to properly maintain and keep in a state of good and 
serviceable repair the common property and personal property vested in them.28 
Initially, the Owners Corporation acted as agent for the owner of the lots subject to the 
strata scheme.29  However, as the lots were sold to other proprietors, the Owners 
Corporation held the common property as agent for those purchasers as tenants in 
common in shares proportional to their unit entitlements.30  Importantly, the Owners 
Corporation had no contractual relationship with the builder or the developer.31 
Predictably, a dispute arose in regards to latent defects in the common property, which 
were grouped into five categories: non-compliant steel lintels; non-compliant picture 
windows; defective external render; unsuitable cowlings to fire services shutters; and 
inadequate waterproofing and waste connection to a communal spa.32  In 2008 the 
                                                          
20 Ibid 414 [15] (French CJ). 
21 Ibid 428 [74] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
22 Ibid 430 [86] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid 430 [87] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ); 414 [16] (French CJ). 
25 Ibid 430 [89] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ); 414 [16] (French CJ). 
26 Ibid 430 [90] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
27 Ibid.  See, Strata Schemes (Freehold Development) Act 1973 (NSW) s 18 (‘SSFD Act’). 
28 Ibid 422 [44] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ).  See, SSM Act s 62. 
29 Ibid.  See, SSFD Act s 20. 
30 Ibid.  See, SSFD Act s 20(b). 
31 See, Cucinotta, above n 2, 141. 
32 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 431 [96] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
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Owners Corporation brought proceedings against the builder to recover the costs of 
rectifying the alleged defects in the common property.33  
III     DECISION OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE 
 
The primary judge, McDougall J was asked to determine whether the builder owed the 
Owners Corporation a duty to take reasonable care to avoid reasonably foreseeable 
economic loss to the Owners Corporation in having to make good the consequences 
of latent defects.34  The damage was characterised as economic loss because the 
defects did not cause damage to person or property.35  In order for the Owners 
Corporation to establish that the builder owed the duty of care alleged, it had to 
demonstrate that it was reasonably foreseeable that the Owners Corporation would not 
only suffer loss, but that it was ‘vulnerable’ to the economic consequences of such a 
failure by the builder.  
At first instance it was held that no duty of care existed to avoid pure economic loss 
as a consequence of the latent defects caused by the building’s design and 
construction.  As no duty of care arose in respect to the developer, no duty passed to 
the successive title owners, such as the Owners Corporation.  
Noting that the duty of care alleged is one to avoid causing economic loss, McDougall 
J found that ‘the duty is novel’ as no case was cited to establish such a duty of care of 
the kind alleged.36  He also pointed out that Bryan37 was no authority for imposition 
of the duty alleged.38   
Although McDougall J accepted ‘the proposition that contractual and common law 
duties could coexist between parties to a contract’ he was of the view that it was ‘not 
so as a matter of absolute or general application’ and that ‘there is neither reason nor 
room for the imposition of a duty of care in the case of a contract negotiated at arm's 
length between parties of equal standing, who are able to bargain for and obtain the 
benefits that they seek, and to pay the price that they think appropriate’.39  In relation 
to the provision of specialist services of the kind which the developer agreed to, 
McDougall J held that where ‘the parties have negotiated in full their rights and 
obligations, there is no reason for the law to intervene by imposing some general law 
duty of care’.40  McDougall J (in endorsing Brennan J’s views expressed in Bryan) 
remarked that an ‘extension of remedies’ under a duty of care by a builder to 
subsequent purchasers in tort is ‘properly a matter for Parliament’.41  He also raised 
the matter of ‘policy’, pointing out that ‘the critical questions to be considered [lie] in 
deciding whether, as a matter of policy, the law should impose, on a builder in the 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid 411 [6] (French CJ) 
35 Ibid 426 [67] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
36 First Instance Decision [2012] NSWSC 1219, 87-88. 
37 (1995) 182 CLR 609.  
38 First Instance Decision [2012] NSWSC 1219, 88. 
39 Ibid 89. 
40 Ibid 90. 
41 Ibid 92.  See Bryan (1995) 182 CLR 609, 644 (Brennan J). 
BROOKFIELD MULTIPLEX LTD V OWNERS CORPORATION STRATA PLAN 61288 
177 
 
position of Brookfield, a duty of care (over and above the statutory warranties) in 
favour of a successor in title to the developer, such as the Owners Corporation.’42  
IV     DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL 
On 25 September 2013 the Owners Corporation appealed to the New South Wales 
Court of Appeal.43  The appeal was allowed and the orders of the primary judge were 
set aside.  The court held that the duty of care propounded by the Owners Corporation, 
matched an equivalent tortious duty of care owed by the builder to the developer.44  
As such, the builder owed the Owners Corporation a duty to exercise reasonable care 
in the construction of the building, to avoid causing the Owners Corporation to suffer 
loss resulting from the latent defects in the common property vested in them.45  The 
court, however, confined the scope of the duty to building defects that were structural, 
constituted a danger to persons or property in or in the vicinity of the serviced 
apartments, or made the apartments uninhabitable.46    
As regards the ‘vulnerability’ requirement, Basten JA declared that ‘there can be no 
doubt that the developer relied upon the expertise, care and honesty of the builder in 
performing its obligations under the contract’.47  He pointed out though that ‘the fact 
that the vulnerability arose with respect to its commercial interests rather than any 
personal interests of individuals, was not suggested to be a relevant consideration.’48   
 
The builder, by special leave, appealed to the High Court of Australia.  
V     THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT    
 
The High Court unanimously allowed the builder’s appeal under four separate 
judgments, finding that the builder did not owe a duty of care to the Owners 
Corporation.  There was a common finding that the parties had expressly addressed in 
detail their obligations under the relevant contracts, evidencing that they had 
consciously and deliberately decided to allocate the relevant risks between them in the 
manner set out.      
 
A   The Appellant’s Submissions 
 
The builder argued that no concurrent tortious duty of care should be imposed on the 
developer as the parties had reached a comprehensive agreement at arm’s length which 
outlined their relationship and the associated risks.49  It also submitted that whatever 
its obligations were to the developer, it did not owe the Owners Corporation the duty 
of care alleged.50 
                                                          
42 First Instance Decision [2012] NSWSC 1219, 93. 
43 The Court of Appeal consisted of Basten, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA. 
44 Court of Appeal Decision (2013) 85 NSWLR 479, 508-509 [122].  See also, Brookfield (2014) ALR 
408, 426 [64] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
45 Court of Appeal Decision (2013) 85 NSWLR 479, 510 [132], 511 [133], 512 [139]. 
46 Ibid.   
47 Court of Appeal Decision (2013) 85 NSWLR 479, 508 [120].  See also, Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 
432 [102] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
48 Court of Appeal Decision (2013) 85 NSWLR 479, 508 [120]. 
49 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 434 [113] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).   
50 Ibid 434 [114] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
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B   The Respondent’s Submissions 
 
The Owners Corporation cross-appealed on four matters. 
 
1   Each Entity should be Viewed Separately  
 
The Owners Corporation submitted that the ‘duty of care propounded by it does not 
depend on finding an equivalent duty of care’ owed by the builder to the developer 
and therefore, the salient features of the relationship between the builder and the 
Owners Corporation should be viewed separately from the relationship between the 
builder and the developer.51  
 
2   The Owners Corporation Was Vulnerable  
 
In light that the Owners Corporation had not come into existence until the registration 
of the strata plan, it was vulnerable to the risk of loss from latent defects in the common 
property as it had no prior opportunity to protect itself.52 
3   Assumptions of Responsibility and Reliance 
 
Alternatively, there was an assumption of liability by the builder to the developer for 
latent defects, and reliance by the developer on the builder.  Therefore, a duty of care 
in tort arises, equivalent to the duty propounded by the Owners Corporation.53  
4   Dangerous Defects 
 
The Owners Corporation also contended, contrary to the Court of Appeal’s finding, 
that the nature and scope of the propounded duty should not be restricted to latent 
defects that were ‘dangerous’.54  
C   Applicable Principles and Precedents 
 
Members of the High Court undertook an examination of the applicable principles and 
precedents in relation to a duty of care for pure economic loss.   
In remarking that part of the difficulty that the Court of Appeal faced was ‘in 
discerning the principle’ for which Bryan ‘remains authority’55 after Woolcock, 
Gageler J referred to the ‘net cost to society’ that arises from uncertainty as to the 
principles to apply in economic loss cases.56  He agreed with the proposition that if 
                                                          
51 Ibid 434 [115] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ).  The salient features relied upon by the Owners 
Corporation included: the builder’s power of administration in regards to the D&C contract; the 
expertise of the developer in business; the commercial cost to the developer to monitor construction 
work; and general notions of assumption of responsibility and reliance. 
52 Ibid 435 [116] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
53 Ibid 435 [118] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid 448 [178] (Gageler J). 
56 Ibid 447 [177]. 
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negligence law is to serve its purpose in corrective justice, the principles and rules 
governing the area must be clear and easy to apply.57 
As highlighted by French CJ, a finding of liability in negligence, is predicated upon a 
duty of care existing.58  A failure to take reasonable care to prevent a foreseeable harm 
will result in liability where there was a duty to take such care.59 Prior to 1964 pure 
economic loss was not recoverable in tort, leaving a party to rely on contract law 
remedies.60  However, precedents have since developed and for the purpose of this 
appeal, French CJ narrowed the applicable cases to Bryan61 and Woolcock.62 
1   Consideration of Bryan  
 
In Bryan the court considered whether under the law of negligence a professional 
builder who constructs a house for an owner of the land owes a prima facie duty to a 
subsequent owner to exercise reasonable care to avoid foreseeable damage.63  A breach 
of the duty, by the careless construction of the builder which gives rise to latent 
defects, supports an action in negligence for economic loss.64  The court held that the 
builder of a dwelling house owed a duty of care to the subsequent purchaser.  This 
decision was founded on the existence of an anterior duty of care to the prior owner, 
which supported the existence of a duty of care to the subsequent owner;65 no 
disconformity existed between these duties.66  The presence of an anterior duty 
overcame ‘policy concerns’ that liability to a subsequent owner would be inconsistent 
with the defendant’s ‘legitimate pursuit of its freedom to protect its own financial 
interests by limiting its liability to the prior owner.’67  Additionally, the building 
contract allowed for concurrent tortious liability to the prior owner.68  
To find a duty of care for pure economic loss the case must be considered ‘special.’  
Special cases involve an element of known reliance or dependence on the part of the 
plaintiff, or the assumption of responsibility by the defendant.69  The plurality in Bryan 
referred to the relationship between the builder and the subsequent owner as being 
characterised by an assumption of responsibility on the part of the builder and likely 
reliance on the part of the owner.70  The relevant factors supporting this finding 
revolved around considerations of vulnerability; including the existence of a ‘non-
detailed contract’ between the prior owner and the builder that contains no exclusion 
or limitation of liability.71  In addition, if the subsequent owner of the property would 
ordinarily be unskilled in building and real property investment, and such an owner 
                                                          
57 Ibid citing Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 216 [91]. 
58 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 415[19] (French CJ) 
59 Ibid 415-16 [19]-[21] (French CJ), citing Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562, 576 [42]. 
60 See Hedley Bryne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465. 
61 (1995) 182 CLR 609. 
62 (2004) 216 CLR 515. 
63 (1995) 182 CLR 609, 616-17.  See Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 448 [179] (Gageler J). 
64 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 416 [21] (French CJ). 
65 Ibid 418 [28]. 
66 Bryan (1995) 182 CLR 609, 665 (Toohey J). 
67 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 418 [28] (French CJ); Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 CLR 609, 623-24 
(Mason CJ, Deane and Gaudron JJ). 
68 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 418 [28] (French CJ). 
69 Ibid 417 [22]. 
70 Ibid 448 [180] (Gageler J) citing Bryan (1995) 182 CLR 609, 627. 
71 Ibid 417 [22] (French CJ). 
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would assume the building had been competently built, this must be taken into 
consideration.72  French CJ concluded that when these factors are found to exist, they 
will support the existence of a duty of care for pure economic loss. 
While such considerations remain paramount, the court in Woolcock expressed 
concern that Bryan’s drew a distinction between cases involving the construction of a 
dwelling and those concerning the construction of other buildings.73  Gageler J who 
was equally concerned, dedicated a substantial part of his judgement towards 
articulating why the principles in Bryan remain authority after Woolcock, yet why 
Woolcock should be followed in the present appeal.  In light of this, the judges in 
Brookfield confined the application of Bryan to its facts.  
The justices in in Brookfield distinguished Bryan due to the detailed provisions in the 
D&C contract, as opposed to the basic obligation to exercise reasonable skill and 
diligence in Bryan.  Additionally, the express promises in the sale contract differed 
from the absence of a promise as to the building quality in Bryan.74 
Bryan demonstrated no disconformity between the duty owed to the original owner 
and the duty owed to the subsequent owner.  By contrast in Brookfield there was no 
substantial equivalence between the obligations of the builder to the developer and the 
duty propounded by the Owners Corporation due to the terms of the contract.75  In 
addition, the purchaser exercised ‘contractual wisdom’ to bargain for protection 
against the risk of defects, and the builder was not involved with the purchaser’s 
decision to accept the value of the warranty.76  As McHugh J similarly stated in 
Woolcock, had the purchaser not been satisfied that its investment was adequately 
protected, it could have taken its capital elsewhere.77  
Gageler J confined the authority in Bryan to cases where the building involved is a 
‘dwelling house’ and subsequent purchasers can show that they fall within ‘a class of 
persons incapable of protecting themselves from the consequences of the builder’s 
want of reasonable care.’78 Outside of that category, his Honour held that it should 
now be acknowledged that a builder has no duty in tort to exercise reasonable care in 
executing building work, to avoid subsequent purchasers incurring the cost of 
repairing latent defects.79 By virtue of the ‘freedom they have to choose the price and 
non-price terms’ of the contract to purchase, there is no reason why subsequent 
purchasers cannot be expected to protect themselves against economic loss.80 
2   Consideration of Woolcock  
 
All members of the High Court in Brookfield reasoned by analogy that it aligned closer 
with Woolcock than Bryan.  Woolcock81 concerned an engineering company which 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
73 Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 528 [17]. 
74 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 439 [136] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ). 
75 Ibid 440 [139]. 
76 Ibid [140]. 
77 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 440 [140] (Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ), citing McHugh J in Bryan 
(2004) 216 CLR 515, 558 [110]. 
78 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 450 [185] (Gageler J). 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 (2004) 216 CLR 515.   
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had designed the foundations of a warehouse and office complex. After the purchase 
was completed it became apparent that the building was suffering ‘substantial 
structural distress.’82  The question addressed by the court concerned whether the 
engineering company owed a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a subsequent 
purchaser sustaining economic loss.  The engineering company had designed the 
foundations in conditions where the original owner asserted control over all 
geotechnical investigations that the engineer undertook to perform its work.83  In 
addition, there was no allegation of any assumption of responsibility by the 
engineering company or of any known reliance by the prior owner.84  In light of this 
the court found that the scope of the work undertaken included consideration for 
alleged defects in the design of the foundations.  Therefore, the engineering company 
was found not to owe the putative duty of care for economic loss.85 
Furthermore, the subsequent owner in Woolcock did not allege that it could not protect 
itself against the economic loss.86  While the High Court in Woolcock could not answer 
definitively whether the plaintiff was vulnerable, the following factors were extracted 
and highlighted by French CJ87 as being insufficient to demonstrate ‘vulnerability’ in 
Woolcock:88 
1) that the plaintiff could have protected itself against the economic loss it 
suffered; 
2) that a warranty of freedom from defect was included in the contract entered 
into by the plaintiff in purchasing the complex; 
3) that the prior owner assigned its rights in respect of any claim for defects to 
the plaintiff;  
4) that there was evidence evincing circumstances that would cast onto the 
engineering company the burden of any economic consequences due to its own 
negligence; and 
5) that there was evidence supporting the plaintiff being able to obtain the benefit 
of the terms of that kind in the contract.  
 
Gagler J in Brookfield identified examples from Woolcock that demonstrated how 
subsequent purchasers may protect themselves against the risk of latent defects 
including, adjusting the terms of the contract between the purchaser and vendor and 
commissioning expert investigation before purchase.89  A decisive factor for rejecting 
the existence of a duty of care in tort for pure economic loss is whether a person can 
be protected from damage by means of contractual obligations.90 
The judges in in Brookfield made a clear distinction between the reasoning in Bryan 
and Woolcock, with Hayne and Kiefel JJ focusing on the departing circumstances of 
each case. The decision in Bryan depended upon the existence of an anterior duty of 
                                                          
82 See Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 449 [181] (Gageler J). 
83 Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 531-532 [25]. 
84 See Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 418 [27] (French CJ). 
85 Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 532 [27] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ) cited in 
Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 418 [26] (French CJ), 423 [49] (Hayne and Kiefel JJ). 
86 Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 533 [31]. 
87 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 418 [29] (French CJ). 
88 Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 533 [31] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). 
89 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 449 [183] citing Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 550 [85], 558-559 
[111]. 
90 Brookfield (2014) ALR 408, 449 [182] (Gageler J) citing Woolcock (2004) 216 CLR 515, 552 [94]. 
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care to avoid economic loss to the original owner of the kind suffered by the 
subsequent purchaser.91 While in Woolcock, neither reliance by the original owner on, 
nor the assumption of responsibility by, the engineering company existed.92 Therefore, 
the plurality held that the extension of an original duty owed by the builder to the 
owner, as found in Bryan, could not be applied to Woolcock.   It appears that Woolcock 
used the case of Bryan as an example of a decision that was based on ‘notions of 
assumption of responsibility and known reliance.’93  
Woolcock also clarified that ‘vulnerability’ could be used as rationale for the 
exceptions to the general rule, demonstrating that vulnerability is concerned not only 
with the reasonable foreseeability of loss where reasonable care is not taken, but also 
with the inability of the plaintiff to take steps to protect itself from the risk of loss.94 It 
was on these grounds and its factual similarity that the High Court in Brookfield used 
this precedent.  
 
3   Was the Owners Corporation ‘Vulnerable’? 
 
The notion of ‘vulnerability’ is a paramount consideration in determining the existence 
of a duty of care for pure economic loss.95  The High Court found vulnerability to refer 
to a plaintiff’s ‘inability to protect itself from the defendant’s want of reasonable 
care.’96  This inability can be absolute or sufficient enough to cast the consequences 
of the loss on the defendant.97 The justices in Brookfield found that the question of 
vulnerability, consistent with the decision in Woolcock, would determine the outcome 
of the appeal.98 
Hayne and Kiefel JJ made two assumptions in their assessment of vulnerability. 
Firstly, the developer and the purchasers relied on the builder to do its work properly. 
This assumption was also made in regards to the Owners Corporation which ‘was in 
no better position to check the quality of the builder’s work’ as it was being carried 
out by the original purchaser of the lot.99  
Intrinsic to an assessment of vulnerability are factors supporting reliance. However, 
Hayne and Kiefel JJ deemed the element of reliance as being insufficient on its own.100 
Both judges agreed that the existence of the Master Agreement, the D&C and the sale 
contracts, all of which provided for defects in the common property which was vested 
in the Owners Corporation, militated against a finding that the parties could not protect 
their own interests.101 On this observation, the builder did not owe the Owners 
Corporation a duty of care.  Their Honours closed their judgement by stating that a 
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conclusion about the absence of vulnerability does not depend upon ‘detailed analysis 
of the particular content of the contracts the parties made’.102   
Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ were at odds with the opinion of the Court of Appeal that 
the developer, by relying on the expertise of the builder in performing its obligations, 
was vulnerable.103 This position was taken after a consideration of the role of the 
Superintendent, who was responsible for issuing the Final Certificates under the D&C 
contract. Due to this role, the Superintendent acted as a protection mechanism for the 
developer and as such, no vulnerability could be alleged.104 
(a)  Salient Features of the Relationship 
 
The strict application of precedent resulted from what French CJ determined to be ‘an 
element of novelty’ involving the intertwined relationship between the parties.105 
Therefore, in addition to factors supporting vulnerability, French CJ considered the 
salient features of the relationship between the Owners Corporation and the builder.106  
French CJ first held that in light of the D&C contract, the developer would not be 
taken to have relied upon any responsibility on the part of the builder in relation to 
pure economic loss flowing from latent defects, beyond the responsibility imposed on 
it by the D&C contract.107 This decision was reached as the Owners Corporation was 
controlled by the developer and Park Hotel, who were party to, and therefore aware 
of, the contract and the extent of the builder’s obligations and liabilities in respect to 
defects in the common property.108  
Secondly, in relation to whether a duty of care was owed to the Owners Corporation 
by virtue of its relationship to subsequent purchasers from the developer,109 French CJ 
answered in the negative. The purchasers of the apartments were ‘effectively 
investors’ in the hotel under the sale contracts, which contained provisions relating to 
the developer’s obligation to undertake repairs. Therefore, such provisions provided 
the reason as to why the purchasers could not be found to be vulnerable.110 The 
position of the purchasers and the interaction between the contractual and statutory 
matrix was antithetical to a finding that the builder owed the Owners Corporation a 
duty.111 Therefore, French CJ concluded that no duty of care existed in respect of pure 
economic loss flowing from latent defects owed by the builder to the developer. 
Correspondingly, no duty of care was owed by the builder to any subsequent 
owners.112 
 
4    Assumption of Responsibility and Known Reliance 
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French CJ dealt succinctly with the assumption of responsibility and reliance by 
pointing to the D&C contract. His Honour found that the responsibility assumed by 
the builder, in regards to the developer, was detailed in the D&C contract and 
therefore, the developer could not have relied upon any responsibility on the builder’s 
behalf in relation to pure economic loss flowing from latent defects outside of the 
limits imposed by the contract.113  
In addition, the fact that the Owners Corporation did not exist at the time the defective 
work occurred went against a finding that the Owners Corporation could have relied 
upon the builder in any way;114 there was no assumption of responsibility by the 
builder in favour of the Owners Corporation, nor known reliance on the builder by it.  
 
5   Existence of a Duty of Care 
 
Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ disagreed with the argument that the duty propounded by 
the Owners Corporation was owed by the builder to the developer concurrently in 
contract and tort. The liability of the builder to the developer was the subject of 
detailed provisions in the D&C contract, regarding the risk of latent defects in the 
builder’s work. These provisions expressly cast onto the builder the risk of expense to 
make good defects, and secured performance of the D&C contract. Their Honours 
found that to force upon such provisions an obligation to take reasonable care to avoid 
‘a reasonably foreseeable economic loss to the developer’ in having to make good the 
consequences of the defects, would be to alter the allocation of risk and liability 
effected by the contract.115  
Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ found the reasoning of the Court of Appeal to be 
inconsistent with Woolcock as to whether there was a duty owed by the builder to the 
Owners Corporation independent of its obligations to the developer. As the purchasers 
insisted on contractual rights against the developer in the sale contract, there existed 
no evidence that the purchaser was deprived of negotiating for a more extensive 
warranty with the developer, by virtue of the builder’s conduct.116  In addition, the 
builder did not assume responsibility to the purchaser for its decision.117 
 
6   A Question of Dangerous Defects? 
 
Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ dispelled the notion that a builder owes a duty of care in 
tort to subsequent purchasers if it is foreseeable that a failure to take reasonable care 
in the building work would create dangerous defects. While the Owners Corporation 
relied on the Canadian case of Winnipeg Condominium,118 their Honours saw practical 
difficulty with its application for two reasons. Firstly, the existence of such a duty will 
not be known until after the defects occur and are categorised.119 Secondly, relying on 
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the judgement of Lord Oliver in Murphy v Brentwood District Council,120 they found 
the distinction between defect and dangerous defect fallacious.121  
VI     CONCLUSION 
 
The Brookfield decision is significant as it clarified the uncertainty surrounding 
recovery for pure economic loss in tort.  The High Court affirmed the relevance of an 
assessment of vulnerability, the assumption of responsibility and known reliance in 
claims for pure economic loss.  It also dealt with how past precedents such as Bryan 
and Woolcock should be approached.  It addressed the difficulty in arguing that 
negligence for pure economic loss should be excluded on the basis that a claim may 
undermine doctrines of law or contract.122  It refused, however, to acknowledge a 
general test for pure economic loss, rejecting the notion that it would be an error to 
give remedy in tort for economic loss due to the compartmentalisation of contract and 
tort law in Australia.123 Crennan, Bell and Keane JJ made it clear that recovery for 
economic loss should be seen as an exception to the general rule, that damages for 
economic loss which are not consequential upon damage to person or property are not 
recoverable in negligence even if the loss is foreseeable.124 In addition to reaffirming 
the importance of allocating risk in contracts, the High Court definitively concluded 
that a builder will not have a duty to exercise reasonable care in executing building 
work to avoid a subsequent purchaser incurring the cost of repairing latent defects.125  
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